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COMMENTS
DISCHARGE: THE PRIME MOVER OF BANKRUPTCY
Jay W. Ungerman
During the fiscal year of 1960, 110,034 bankruptcy cases were
filed in the United States district courts.' Thus, there was approxi-
mately one bankruptcy for every 895 people of working age, i.e., 18
years to 65 years. During the first quarter of the 1961 fiscal year,
32,766 bankruptcy cases were filed reaching an all time high and
increasing 35.3 per cent over the first quarter of the 1960 fiscal year.
Thus, the possibility that this year's figures will be quite staggering
is apparent. Out of the total number of cases filed, 10.4 per cent
(3,393) were business bankruptcies, while 89.6 per cent (29,373)
were nonbusiness bankruptcies. This distribution agrees with the
trend of recent years; nonbusiness bankruptcies have been increasing
at a faster pace than business bankruptcies.' In addition, figures from
the 1960 fiscal year show that approximately 98.8 per cent of the
bankruptcy cases commenced were voluntary. Further, out of the
total number of cases concluded after a declaration of bankruptcy,
discharge4 was denied in only 1.3 per cent, waived in 2.8 per cent, and
granted in 95.9 per cent. The net result was that only 6.3 per cent
of the total liabilities ($705,314,302.86) was paid to the creditors
($44,150,278.62).' Such statistics can point to only one conclusion,
viz., the primary purpose of the great majority of bankruptcies is the
obtaining of the bankrupt's discharge from his debts.
A few years after the passage of the present Bankruptcy Act,' an
article appeared in the Harvard Law Review' warning against inter-
' Rep. Director Adm. Office U. S. Courts, Memorandum No. 197 (Sept. 1960).
2 Ibid.
3Rep. Director Adm. Office U. S. Courts, Memorandum No. 197 (Sept. 1960).
4 A discharge is the release of a bankrupt from all of his dischargeable debts which are
provable in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 52 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C.A. § 1(15) (Supp. 1960). A discharge does not extinguish the bankrupt's debts, but
affords him an affirmative defense which can be plead in any subsequent action. In re Innis,
140 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736 (1944). There is a possibility of the
bankruptcy court issuing an injunction for protection when a court refuses to recognize a
discharge as a defense. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). Furthermore, an
order that fails to discharge the bankrupt's debts for any reason is res judicata as to those
debts in future bankruptcy proceedings. In re Bacon, 193 Fed. 34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
225 U.S. 701 (1912), with the exception of § 14c(5), 52 Stat. 850, as amended, 11
U.S.C.A. § 32 (c)(5) (1953), which stands on a different footing from a refusal on any
other ground. Prudential Loan & Fin. Co. v. Roberts, 52 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1931).
5 Rep. Director Adm. Office U. S. Courts, Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics (ending June
30, 1960).
6Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
883, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-1200 (Supp. 1960).
Olmstead, Bankruptcy-A Commercial Regulation, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 843 (1903).
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preting the act in the nature of a "Hebrew Jubilee,"' for an inter-
pretation of this nature would result in the Bankruptcy Act's repeal
as on numerous prior occasions.! The article's thesis was that the
bankruptcy law is "essentially a commercial regulation, and that its
main objects are administration or distribution, rather than the relief
of the debtor." Although this warning has not been heeded, as
evidenced by the above statistics, the Bankruptcy Act has survived
over six decades and apparently will continue in the future.
The primary purpose of this Comment is to examine the purpose
of the discharge in bankruptcy in the light of our highly complex
credit economy. A discussion of the history, procedure, and pro-
visions of the discharge section of the present Bankruptcy Act"0 will
necessarily be included in this endeavor.
I. HISTORY OF DISCHARGE
The bankruptcy laws, being purely statutory in nature, developed
slowly. Bankruptcy laws were originally creditors' laws, with no
thought of affording any relief to the bankrupt by freeing him from
further molestation by his creditors." A criminal approach was
prominent in the early Roman times as expressed in the Twelve
Tables (451-450 B.C.). The latter provided that if one was unable
to pay his debts, his creditors were entitled to cut up his body, divid-
ing the pieces among themselves, or merely to sell the debtor into
slavery." The criminal approach, although reduced to debt-slavery,
existed in Rome until the passage of the law of Cessio Bonorum in
the time of Julius Caesar.1 This law, relating to an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, provided that if an honest debtor forfeited
all his property for the benefit of creditors, he would not be subject
to capital punishment, imprisonment, or slavery. Cessio Bonorum did
not provide for a discharge of outstanding obligations, but merely
for immunity from personal punishment. Another distinguishing
factor from modern bankruptcy law is that Cessio Bonorum was
purely voluntary and could not be invoked by creditors.
8The "Hebrew Jubilee" refers to the Jewish Sabbatical Year which came every seven
years and released debtors from their debts. It was instituted more than 3000 years ago.
Deuteronomy 15:1-3.
'The first act, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, was repealed Dec. 19, 1803, 2
Stat. 248; the second, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440, was repealed Mar. 9, 1843,
5 Stat. 614; and the third, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517, as amended, 18 Stat.
178 (1874), was repealed June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99.
10 Bankruptcy Act § 14, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32 (Supp.
1960).
11 In re Neely, 134 Fed. 667, 669 (S.D. N.Y. 1904).
12 Moore, Debtors' and Creditors' Rights 1 (1955).
111 Remington, Bankruptcy 5 (5th ed. 19S0).
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Modern American bankruptcy law, although not criminal, had its
origin in quasi-criminal statutes passed by the English Parliament in
the sixteenth century.14 These statutes were applicable only to traders
of fraudulent debtors, and provided for imprisonment and pro rata
distribution of assets. No relief through discharge of a debtor's debts
was provided. These statutes were mitigated somewhat by the late
seventeenth century's insolvency laws which allowed a debtor's re-
lease from prison (but not discharge of indebtedness) if he surrender-
ed up his estate or took an oath that he had no estate."5 In the eigh-
teenth century, two hundred and fifty years after the first English
bankruptcy act, the English Parliament modified the bankruptcy law
by deleting the criminal sanctions and for the first time allowed a
discharge to the debtor." The debtor's discharge was qualified from
time to time through the addition of various requirements, e.g., his
assets should equal a certain percentage of his debts and a certain
percentage of his creditors should assent to his discharge. 7 Thus, the
theory of bankruptcy law at the time of the American Revolution
was protection of creditors with incidental release of debtors.
The United States Constitution'8 gives the federal government the
power to regulate bankruptcy in the United States. The United States
has had four bankruptcy acts, each allowing for discharge of indebt-
edness, if specified objections available to the creditors were not sus-
tained. The first act, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,"9 applied only to
merchants and traders as debtors in involuntary proceedings. The
discharge sections" required the consent of two-thirds of the creditors
in number and in value who had proven their claims of fifty dollars
or more. In addition, there were specified objections available to
creditors, e.g., failure to comply with the act, concealment of assets,
fraud, losses in gambling, and others. The second act, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1841, 2 added provisions for voluntary proceedings for all
persons, but continued to restrict the involuntary proceedings to
merchants, retailers, bankers, factors, and underwriters. The dis-
charge section" provided for discharge to all debtors allowing certain
objections, e.g., fraud, concealment of assets, preference of creditors,
"4Bankruptcy Act, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (repealed); Bankruptcy Act, 1570,
13 Eliz. 1, c. 7 (repealed); Bankruptcy Act, 1603, 1 James 1, c. 15 (repealed); Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1624, 21 James 1, c. 19 (repealed).
1 Moore, op. cit. supra note 12, at 2.
.6Bankruptcy Act, 1705, 4 Anne, c. 17.
I 1 Remington, op. cit. supra note 13, at 14.
" U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
'82 Stat. 19.
"Sections 34, 35, 36, 37.




willful omission or refusal to obey orders of the court, misappropria-
tion of trust funds, or failure by a merchant, banker, factor, broker,
underwriter, or marine insurer to keep books of account. In addition,
if a majority of the creditors in number and amount filed a written
dissent upon a ground found by the judge to be just, a discharge
could be barred. The third act, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867," pro-
vided both voluntary and involuntary proceedings for all persons.
This act denied a discharge if the debtor (1) willfully swore falsely
in a proceeding, (2) concealed assets, (3) was fraudulent or negli-
gent as to his property, (4) destroyed or falsified his books, (5)
secreted his assets with intent to defraud, (6) gave a fraudulent
preference, (7) made a fraudulent transfer, (8) lost in gambling,
(9) admitted or failed to disclose a fictitious debt, (10) did not
keep proper books of accounts if the debtor were a merchant or
tradesman, (11) obtained discharge consent from creditors by
pecuniary consideration, (12) was convicted of a crime under the
Bankruptcy Act, or (13) committed any fraud contrary to the true
intent of the law. 4 Further, the debtor's assets had to equal fifty
per cent of the claims unless a majority of the creditors in number
or amount consented." The fifty per cent requirement was modified
by an amendment in 1874"3 which abolished the requirement in in-
voluntary proceedings and reduced the requirement to thirty per
cent in voluntary proceedings unless one-fourth of the number of
creditors, providing this number owned at least one-third of the
proven claims, consented to the discharge.
The present act, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,7 omitted the pre-
requisites of consent of creditors or minimum asset requirements,
but permitted creditors' objections on the following grounds: (1)
the bankrupt had committed an act against the Bankruptcy Act
punishable by imprisonment; or (2) the bankrupt "with fraudulent
intent to conceal his true financial condition and in contemplation
of bankruptcy destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books of ac-
counts or records from which his condition might be ascertained."
The amendatory act of 1903" added four additional grounds for
objections: (1) the bankrupt obtained property on credit from any
person by a materially false statement in writing; (2) within four
months of filing of a petition, the bankrupt transferred, destroyed,
23 14 Star. 517.
24 Section 29.
25 Section 33.
26 Section 338, 18 Stat. 178.
251 14b(I)-(2), 30 Stat. 550, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1960).
28§ 14b(3)-(6), 32 Stat. 797, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c)(3)-(6) (Supp. 1960).
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or concealed his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors; (3) the bankrupt obtained a discharge in voluntary pro-
ceedings within six years; and (4) the bankrupt refused to obey a
lawful order of the bankruptcy court or refused to answer a material
question approved by the bankruptcy court. The amendatory act of
1926" added an additional ground, viz., the bankrupt's failure to
explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or deficiencies of assets to
meet liabilities. Under the Chandler Act of 1938,' 0 the grounds of
discharge remained practically unchanged.
II. PROCEDURE FOR DISCHARGE
The Chandler Act of 1938 defined the term "court" in the act to
mean the judge or referee of the court in which a proceeding is
pending."1 The implication from this definition, in light of the
language of the statute, is that in most matters of bankruptcy the
referee exercises full jurisdiction in the first instance subject only to
review by the district judge in the small proportion of cases in which
review is requested.' In other words, the referee is authorized to
perform the duties of the bankruptcy court, with few exceptions,
and all proceedings are required to be before the referee that are not
required to be before a judge." The referee is the judicial officer
charged with the responsibility of nearly all decisions of substantive
law and procedure in the first instance; therefore, there is little that
does not go before him in a complete proceeding.' He has a duty
to maintain an adequate and correct file in the case.' Generally, the
referee can (1) adjudicate debtors bankrupt, (2) grant or deny
discharges, s (3) appoint or remove (for cause) trustees, (4) author-
ize trustees to carry on business, (5) rule on claims for exemptions,
(6) allow or disallow claims for creditors, (7) cause an estate to
be collected, reduced to money, and distributed, (8) determine con-
troversies concerning property claimed by the estate, and (9) confirm
or reject arrangements or plans. In addition, a referee may issue
2a 14b(7), 44 Stat. 663, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c)(7) (Supp. 1960).
"§ 14c, 52 Stat. 850, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c) (Supp. 1960). This was a
broad, sweeping reform of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
1§ 1(9), 52 Stat. 840, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1(9) (Supp. 1960).
"Chandler, The Beginning of a New Era in Bankruptcy Administration, 1939-1947,
34 Ref. J. 3 (1960).
"General Order 12, 172 U.S. 653, 657 (1898), as amended, 305 U.S. 681, 686 (1938).
't MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 70 (1956).
3'Id. at 116.
36Prior to 1938, an application for discharge went directly to the judge since the re-
feree had no power to grant the discharge. However, by section 38(4) of the Chandler
Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 857, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 66(4) (1943), the referee is now
expressly given the power to grant, deny, or revoke a discharge.
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process, make orders, and enter such judgments as may be necessary
to enforce the Bankruptcy Act." A referee cannot, however, enforce
his orders by commitments for contempt, but rather must certify
the facts to a district judge for enforcement."
The adjudication of bankruptcy operates automatically as an ap-
plication for discharge in the case of any natural person unless the
right of discharge is waived. A corporation has six months after
adjudication in which to apply for a discharge." The referee then
fixes a date for the creditors' meeting at which the bankrupt may
be examined, and fixes a time limit for filing objections to the bank-
rupt's discharge; notice is given to all parties and to the United
States Attorney for the district."0 At the expiration of the time limit
the discharge is granted provided no objections have been filed; if
objections are filed, a hearing is held thereon,4 ' during which the
bankrupt's right to a discharge is determined."' Beyond certain ex-
ceptions, viz., upholding discharge until termination of contempt
proceedings pending against the bankrupt4 ' and allowing creditors to
protect judgments against third parties," the referee is not in the
position of an opposer." Rather, the referee is charged with the duty
of granting the discharge without conducting an inquisition or
allowing personal sentiment or a sense of justice to dictate a decision.4
The referee shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bank-
rupt is disqualified on any one of the seven different grounds speci-
fied in section 14c of the Bankruptcy Act, and these grounds must
be specified in duly filed objections.4 A fortiori, the referee should
discharge the bankrupt from the debts if no objection has been filed.4 '
The substance of objections to discharge must be plead with great
"Bankruptcy Act 5 2, 30 Stat. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 11 (Supp.
1960).
aS Bankruptcy Act 55 2(16), 38(2), 41b, 30 Stat. 545, 555, 556 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 11(16) (Supp. 1960), 66(2), 69b (1943).
"' Bankruptcy Act § 14a, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. S 32(a) (1953).
40Bankruptcy Act § 14b, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(b)
(Supp. 1960).
4 The referee sets a date for the hearing to give all concerned a reasonable time to be
heard. Bankruptcy Act § 14b, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(b)
(Supp. 1960). The hearing is in the nature of a separate civil suit, and amounts to a trial
in equity, In re Amer, 228 Fed. 576 (E.D. Pa. 1915), and the bankrupt may, if he
wishes, waive his discharge. Bankruptcy Act § 14a, 30 Star. 550 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C.A. § 32(a) (1953). The referee may rule on the admissibility of evidence, administer
oaths, and examine the bankrupt. General Order 22, 172 U.S. 653, 661 (1898), as amended,
305 U.S. 681, 692 (1938).
J' Laube, Collier Bankruptcy Manuel 177 (rev. ed. 1960).
"' In re Kretsch, 172 Fed. 523 (S.D. N.Y. 1909).
"4Ingram v. Wilson, 125 Fed. 913 (8th Cir. 1903).
4s In re Walsh, 256 Fed. 653 (7th Cir. 1919).
487 Remington, Bankruptcy 94 (6th ed. 1955).
"'In re De Cillis, 83 F. Supp. 802 (D. Mass. 1949).
"In re Miller, 39 F.2d 919 (D. Minn. 1930).
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particularity, as mere general averments of fact are not sufficient, i.e.,
the objecting creditor should plead the facts, not just the sub-
division. 9 Thus, the objecting creditor must allege a statutory ground,
showing freedom from laches ° and verification. 5 The bankrupt is
not obligated to answer. "
The party objecting to the discharge has the initial burden of
proof"3 even if the bankrupt does not answer." In order for the
burden to shift to the bankrupt, the objector must make out a
prima facie case" showing that there are "reasonable grounds" for
believing that the bankrupt has committed an act which would pre-
vent his discharge."0 Suspicious circumstances alone are not "reason-
able grounds" and do not warrant a shifting of the burden."7 After
the burden shifts to the bankrupt, he must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the allegations of the specifications are untrue.'8
If evidence is in equilibrium, the discharge must be denied. ' Thus,
the referee must dispose of the case according to the standard of
persuasiveness supplied by the requirement that the objector must
show "to the satisfaction of the court" reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the bankrupt has committed an act which would be a ground
for denying his discharge. Moreover, this standard has a well-accepted
meaning in ordinary civil cases."
The referee is vested by the Bankruptcy Act with jurisdiction
"subject always to review by the judge."'" He is not "endowed with
any independent judicial authority" and "is not in any sense a
separate court."'" Nevertheless, the referee's findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and orders are upheld unless deemed "clearly errone-
ous." 3 The referee's findings should not be set aside lightly because
judges should give due weight to the referee's advantage in observing
the witness while testifying."
49 Remmers v. Merchants'-Laclede Nat'l Bank, 173 Fed. 484 (8th Cir. 1909).
'0 In re Ruhlman, 279 Fed. 250 (2d Cir. 1922).
"' Manson v. Inge, 13 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1926).
" Laube, op. cit. supra note 42, at 180.
" In re Leichter, 197 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 914 (1953).
5 Laube, op. cit. supra note 42, at 181.
"Jones v. Gertz, 121 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1941).
5 Dixwell v. Scott & Co., 115 F.2d 873 (lst Cir. 1940).
" In re Tumen, 58 F. Supp. 210 (D. N.J.), aff'd, 146 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 878 (1944).
SIn re Melniker Hammock Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1930).
9 In re Rolland, 43 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. La. 1942).
"0In re Smatlak, 99 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1938).
" Bankruptcy Act § 38, 30 Stat. 555 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. S 66 (1943).
6 5Weidhorn v. Levy, 253 U.S. 268, 271 (1920).
"
3 General Order 47, 286 U.S. 573 (1932), as amended, 305 U.S. 681, 702 (1939).
64 MacLachlan, op. cit. supra note 34, at 89.
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III. GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF DISCHARGE
One referee in bankruptcy stated, "There are seven statutory
grounds for denying a discharge. . . .Most of them involve moral
turpitude in one way or another. If your client is honest, he will
almost certainly receive a discharge.""5 It is well settled that the
discharge provisions merely provide an opportunity to the honest
bankrupt to reinstate himself in the business world,66 and they are
not intended to be available to the dishonest bankrupt. In other
words, only the honest bankrupt who used good faith in dealing with
his property" and gave a true and honest presentation of his financial
affairs reflecting his entire business8 is entitled to a discharge. Thus,
as the aim of the discharge provisions is to prevent frauds, one
court has aptly stated that it is not so much the acts of the bankrupt
that prevent his discharge, but rather the intention with which he
acts." Hence, the following have been held insufficient reasons for
denying a discharge: the giving of a preference;" ° the failure to file
schedules within the proper time;7" an illegal change of name;"2 and
misconduct as a fiduciary." A close look at each of the seven statu-
tory grounds for denial of discharge74 will support the above state-
ments.
A. Criminal Acts
The provision for denial of discharge because of criminal activity
is found at 14c(1) of the Bankruptcy Act:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has (1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided
under title 18, United States Code, section 152 ...
Section 152" provides punishment by imprisonment for eight
criminal offenses dealing with the concealment of assets, false oaths
and claims, and bribery in connection with bankruptcy proceedings.
The commission by the bankrupt of any one of the eight offenses
constitutes a ground for a creditor's objection to discharge.7 6
65 Smith, They Ask the Referee, 34 Ref. J. 105, 113 (1960).
66 Personal Fin. Co. v. Day, 126 F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1942).
67Harris v. Baker, 86 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1936).
68 In re Underhill, 82 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 546 (1936).
69In re Caseldine, 104 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
70 Rutter v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 70 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1934).
71 In re Bauknight, 14 F.2d 674 (S.D. Fla. 1926).
7 In re Dynamic Mfg. Co., 276 Fed. 408 (E.D. Mich. 1921).
73 In re Gara, 190 Fed. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1911).
"
4 Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 30 Star. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. 32(c)
(Supp. 1960).
7562 Stat. 689 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 152 (Supp. 1960).
761 Collier, Bankruptcy 1305 (14th ed. 1956).
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First, section 152 offenses dealing with concealment require that
the concealment be "knowingly and fraudulently" done, i.e., there
must be proof of the fraudulent intent." To bar a discharge, the
bankrupt must intend either to profit by an offense or to deprive his
creditors of their legal right to an apportionment of all the property."8
A bankrupt's failure to schedule or surrender to the trustee prop-
erty belonging to the bankrupt's estate does not necessarily con-
stitute "knowingly and fraudulently" concealing property."9 For
example, failure to include property in the schedules through honest
mistakes of law or fact," failure to include worthless property or
personal property of little value,81 belief by the bankrupt that he
did not own the property8 or that it would not pass to the trustee, 3
or failure to schedule property pursuant to an attorney's advice"
usually will not be made the basis of a refusal to discharge. If such
omission is not satisfactorily explained, however, the court may inter-
pret the omission as being due to a prior fraudulent conveyance."
Moreover, proof of concealment need be shown only by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Secondly, offenses dealing with a false oath under section 152
consist of (1) a false statement or omission in the bankrupt's sched-
ules, or (2) a false statement by the bankrupt at an examination
during the course of the proceeding." The false oath must have been
knowingly and fraudulently made, 8 i.e., the statement must contain
matter which the bankrupt knew to be false and he must have in-
cluded it wilfully with intent to defraud. Hence, a discharge can-
not be denied merely upon the ground that the testimony of the
bankrupt was evasive and may have been false. Furthermore, the
false oath must relate to a material matter." Therefore, testimony
concerning trivial matters or concerning property which can have
7 Tancer v. Wales, 156 F.2d 627 (2d Cit. 1946).
" 1 Collier, op. cit. supra note 76, at 131 5.
78Dilworth v. Boothe, 69 F.2d 621 (5th Cif. 1934).
s1 In re Hope, 18 F.2d 958 (W.D. Mich. 1926).
85In re Kolsrud, 34 F.2d 831 (D. Minn. 1929).
82In re Servel, 30 F.2d 102 (E.D. Idaho 1928).
85 In re Buchanan, 219 Fed. 492 (2d Cit. 1914).
1
4 In re Topper, 229 F.2d 691 (3d Cit. 1956). But the advice must be taken in good
faith. In re Perel, 51 F.2d 506 (S.D. Tex. 1931).
s5 In re Carter, 32 F.2d 186 (2d Cit. 1929).
so In re Merritt, 28 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1928).
871 Collier, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1325.
8 8Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Henderson, 131 F.2d 975 (2d Cit. 1942).
88Arnofsky v. Bostian, 133 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1943). The requisite intent may be
inferred from the facts. In re Royal, 112 Fed. 135 (E.D. N.C. 1901).
9 In re Marcus, 192 Fed. 743 (S.D. N.Y. 1911), aff'd, 203 Fed. 29 (2d Cir. 1913).
81Tancer v. Wales, 156 F.2d 627 (2d Cit. 1946).
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no bearing on the estate's condition is immaterial in a proceeding
under the Bankruptcy Act."2
A close look at some examples in this area may be helpful. A
frequent use of false oaths occurs where the bankrupt knowingly and
fraudulently omits assets from his schedule of property and swears
that the schedule "is a statement of all my property, real and per-
sonal."' 3 Also, a failure to list property which has been fraudulently
conveyed may constitute a false oath.'4 Generally speaking, items
omitted (1) by mistake," (2) upon honest advice of counsel," and
(3) small items omitted without fraud 7 do not constitute a false
oath. It follows that if a bankrupt knowingly and fraudulently
omits the name of a creditor from his schedule of debts and swears
that the schedule "is a true statement of all my debts," he is guilty
of making a false oath." Also a false statement under oath on exami-
nation at a hearing, if the statement is knowingly and fraudulently
false, will bar a discharge," e.g., a bankrupt's false testimony that
he listed all his assets in the schedule"' or his false testimony that he
never made a statement of financial condition..' will bar a discharge.
As in offenses involving concealment, a false oath must be knowingly
and fraudulently made in order to constitute grounds for denial of
a discharge."' Likewise, false testimony caused by honest mistakes
or advice of counsel will not cause a denial of a discharge." 3
B. Inadequate Records
Subsection 14c (2) of the Bankruptcy Act reads as follows:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has . . . (2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to
keep or preserve books of account or records, from which his financial
condition and business transactions might be ascertained, unless the
court deems such acts or failure to have been justified under all the
circumstances of the case; . . .
Prior to the amendment of 1926"4 subsection 14c(2) read "with
"2 In re Taub, 98 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1938).
" 1 Collier, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1327.
"In re Gammon, 109 Fed. 312 (N.D. Iowa 1901).
"5 Kansas Fed. Credit Union v. Niemeier, 227 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1955).
9 In re MacFarlane, 45 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1930).
'
7 In re Taub, 98 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1938).
'Stim v. Simon, 284 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1960).
"In re Marshall, 47 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1931).
''Poff v. Adams, Payne & Gleaves, 226 Fed. 187 (4th Cir. 1915).
1'1In re Zoffer, 211 Fed. 936 (2d Cir. 1914).
12 Willoughby v. Jamison, 103 F.2d 821 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 588 (1939).
... In re Stafford, 226 Fed. 127 (D. Conn. 1915).
10444 Stat. 663, as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c) (2) (Supp. 1960).
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intent to conceal his financial condition .. ."I's Hence, since 1926,
no moral turpitude has been required."'6 The present provision "as
compared with the act of 1898 . . . is partly a liberalization in that
the bankrupt may justify his conduct by mitigating circumstances,
and partly a restriction upon the grant of discharges in that proof
of an 'intent to conceal' is no longer an essential element of proof to
sustain an objection. ' 107 Thus, if a bankrupt breaches his duty to credi-
tors by failing to keep or preserve proper books and records and if he
fails to establish justifying facts and circumstances, discharge will be
denied."' It follows that the cases prior to 1926 are unreliable as
precedent for the present provision"9 because many are based on the
issue of intent."' Yet, it has been said that the early cases are helpful
in determining the standard of conduct to which the bankrupt is
bound and the circumstances under which a failure to conform are
justified.11 This is true especially in cases requiring a voluntary act
similar to intent to conceal, e.g., concealment,' mutiliation, falsifica-
tion, or destruction.' Where a failure to keep or preserve books or
records is proven to have been done with an intent to conceal, the
discharge should be barred, because such action never can be justi-
fied."' Under the present subsection 14c (2), the objector must merely
show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the bankrupt
committed the act, and the burden of proof then shifts to the bank-
rupt."' Thus, if there has been a failure to maintain and preserve
adequate records, the bankrupt must show reasons justifying the in-
adequate.1 . or missing records."'
C. False Financial Statements
Regarding a businessman's obtaining credit through the use of
false financial statements, subsection 14c (3) provides:
"'Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), (amended by 32 Stat. 797 (1903), as
amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c) (2) (Supp. 1960)). Prior to 1903, in the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, the clause read "with fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition and
in contemplation of bankruptcy .... " The italicized words were omitted by the amenda-
tory act of 1903, and the word "intent" was omitted by the amendatory act of 1926
which added the clause "unless the court deem such failure or acts to have been justified
under all circumstances of the cases."
.. White v. Schoenfeld, 117 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1941).
... I Collier, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1338.
... Texas Nat'l Bank v. Edson, 100 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1939).
109 In re Weismann, 1 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
10 Example of requirements of intent: In re Idzall, 96 Fed. 314 (S.D. Iowa 1899).
Ill 1 Collier, op. cit. supra note 76, at 1347-48.
"'In re Weinberg, 42 F.2d 218 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 42 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1930).
113 In re Hodge, 205 Fed. 824 (N.D. N.Y. 1913).
""In re Anderson, 35 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. N.Y. 1940).
In re Di Palo, 218 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1955).
It°Baker v. Trachman, 244 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1957); In re Herzog, 121 F.2d 581 (2d
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 807 (1942).
11 In re Muss, 100 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1938).
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The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has . .. (3) while engaged in business as a sole proprietor, partner-
ship, or as an executive of a corporation, obtained for such business
money or property on credit or as an extension or renewal of credit
by making or publishing or causing to be made or published in any
manner whatsoever a materially false statement in writing respecting
his financial condition or the financial condition of such partnership
or corporation; ...
Under this provision an intent to defraud or deceive is an essential
element,1 '8 i.e., there must be a materially false" ' statement in writ-
ing, intentionally untrue,"' or made so recklessly as to warrant a
finding that the bankrupt acted fraudulently... with the view to
deceive or mislead. 12  Further, the bankrupt must have obtained
money or property on credit or an extension or renewal of credit'
2
1
because his creditors relied on the false statement.124 The bankrupt
does not have to receive a direct benefit from the false statement;
1 2
5
a third-party may be the recipient.' A discharge will not be barred
if the bankrupt made the false statements negligently or inad-
vertently,' or if the facts stated therein were honestly thought to
be true."' There are cases". under subsection 14c(3) which hold a
discharge barred if the statement is false when made, even though
the falsity consisted of an omission of an indebtedness which was
released prior to bankruptcy or an omission of indebtedness in the
belief that the persons to whom the bankrupt was indebted would
not press for payment. Note should be made that subsection 14c (3)
was modified by the 1960 amendment 3 ' to the Bankruptcy Act. The
amendment provides that the use of false financial statements as a
bar to discharge should be limited to businessmen, because "a complete
denial of discharge is too severe a penalty for the non-commercial
bankrupt . . ..." who has little experience with accounting procedures.
118 In the Matter of Barbiere, 192 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1951).
"'Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. 321 (1924).
". In re Schweizer, 271 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1959).
"' In re Santos, 211 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1954).
". In re Josephson, 229 Fed. 272 (D. Ore. 1916).
".. Rogers v. Gardner, 226 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1955).
"' Banks v. Siegel, 181 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1950).
12 In re Marcus, 253 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1958).
1281n re Haydu, 105 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. N.Y. 1952).
12 In re Matthews, 272 Fed. 263 (7th Cir. 1921).
"2 Baash-Ross Tool Co. v. Stephens, 73 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1934).
12 See, e.g., Industrial Bank of Commerce v. Bissell, 219 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1955).
13074 Stat. 408, 11 U.S.C.A. § 32(c) (3) (Supp. 1960).
'' Laube, Collier Pamphlet Edition of the Bankruptcy Act A30 (1960 ed.). This does
not completely relieve the noncommercial bankrupt as he may find himself with a non-
chargeable debt under § 17(2), 74 Stat. 408, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (Supp. 1960).
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D. Fraudulent Activity Regarding Property
Subsection 14c (4) of the act reads as follows:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has . . . (4) at any time subsequent to the first day of the twelve
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed, or permitted
to be removed, destroyed, or concealed, any of his property, with
intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors; . . .
This subsection requires a showing that the acts complained of
were done with an intent to delay, hinder, or defraud the bankrupt's
creditors."' Intent to defraud need not be proven when the allega-
tions are that the creditors are being hindered or delayed. If intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud is proven, '33 the bar to a discharge need
not be based on actual fraud of the creditor. 3 ' The fact that valuable
property has been gratuitously transferred raises a presumption of
fraudulent intent,133 whereas the fact that the property transferred is
of small value seems to negate the intent."' This subsection is not
applicable to assignments for the benefit of creditors, which do not
constitute grounds for denial of a discharge.137
E. Frequent Discharges
Subsection 14c (5) provides:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
* . . (5) in a proceeding under this act commenced within six years
prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been
granted a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement by way
of composition or wage earner's plan by way of composition confirmed
under the act; . . .
The purpose of subsection 14c(5) is to prevent frequent use of
the Bankruptcy Act as a means of avoiding honest debt.3 ' Obviously,
there is no requirement of bad faith or fraudulent intent. This pro-
vision applies equally to the honest and dishonest bankrupt.
132 In re Finder, 61 F.2d 960 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1932). This must
be an actual and not a constructive intent, Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943
(4th Cir. 1960); and an intent to prefer does not constitute the requisite intent. In re
Richter, 57 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1932).
133 In re Beggs, 93 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
134In re Feynman, 77 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1935).
13' Rothschild v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 212 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1954).
13 In re Rice & Reuben, 43 F.2d 378 (D. Me. 1930).
137 Feder v. Goetz, 264 Fed. 619 (2d Cir. 1920).




Full cooperation from the bankrupt is encouraged by subsection
14c(6), which reads as follows:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has . . . (6) in the course of a proceeding under this Act refused to
obey any lawful order of, or to answer any material question approved
by the court; . ..
This provision has no requirement of bad faith or fraudulent in-
tent. The question asked must be material,"' approved by the court,
and lawful. If the order is authorized by statute, then it is lawful.14
Thus, ignoring a lawful order resulting in contempt of court, e.g.,
refusal to appear when subpoenaed, may justify a bar to discharge.'4 '
Furthermore, refusal to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination
will not prevent a bar .42 and a resultant barred discharge will not
be violative of the fifth amendment because bankruptcy is not
criminal in nature.'
43
G. Unsatisfactory Explanation Regarding Assets
The final ground for objecting to a discharge, subsection 14c (7),
provides:
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
* . . (7) has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of assets or de-
ficiency of assets to meet his liabilities: ...
One source states that subsection 14c(7) "is broad enough to
include any unexplained disappearances or shortages of assets14' as
well as mere insolvency itself, i.e., an insufficiency of assets to meet
liabilities.' 4 Furthermore, subsection 14c(7) does not contemplate
petty losses, but rather a sudden depletion in assets immediately
before bankruptcy indicating a desire by the bankrupt to defraud
his creditors. 14 Most of the cases are concerned with the question of
whether the bankrupt has explained satisfactorily any losses or
deficiencies of assets, 14' i.e., an explanation which convinces the court
' In re Kolb, 151 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1945).
140 In re Presnick, 48 F. Supp 685 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
141 In re Simon, 297 Fed. 942 (2d Cir. 1924).
14' In re Bauknight, 14 F.2d 674 (S.D. Fla. 1926).
14' In re Dresser, 146 Fed. 383 (2d Cir. 1906).
1441 Collier, Bankruptcy 1401 (14th ed. 1956).
'
45 Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Schorn, 135 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1943).
14 The opinion has been expressed, however, that since the primary purpose of subsection
14c(7)is to deny a discharge to the dishonest debtor and therefore mere insolvency should
not mean denial of a discharge. Herzog, Failure to Satisfactorily Explain Loss of Assets or
Deficiency of Assets to Meet Liabilities, 34 Ref. J. 100 (1960).
147In re McNay, $8 F. Supp. 960 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
'"" 1 Collier, op. cit. supra note 144, at 1402.
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of good faith and businesslike conduct.' s Hence, the explanation
must be neither a mere general statement".. nor a mere estimate."'
Some examples under subsection 14c (7) will be informative. The
following were held not sufficient to cause a bar: a man living beyond
his means,"2 indefinite account of the expenditure of a bankrupt's
salary,"' decline in gross sales or net earnings, petty losses, and
a shrinkage in commercial value."' Examples of inadequate explana-
tions causing disallowances of discharge are: loss of a particular
asset,"" reduction in total assets," 8 heavy losses,"' and an accounting
shortage.'
IV. THE DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY-
RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE?
Anglo-American bankruptcy law has evolved through three phases:
(1) quasi-criminal with no provision for discharge; (2) discharge
only on consent of the creditors; and (3) automatic discharge, pro-
vided no objections are filed.'' Although all four of the United
States acts have provided for discharges in various forms, the dis-
charge provisions have not been free from attack. On the contrary,
especially since the evolution of the third phase, the discharge has
been the subject of much debate as evidenced by various texts,
articles,' and reports."'
The dichotomy of views expressed in the articles and reports also
have been prevalent in the courts. Although there is little dispute over
the fact that a bankrupt is entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy
149Rameson Bros. v. Goggin, 241 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1957). For what is required of
a bankrupt sufficiently to explain, see Shaiman, Bankruptcy-Section 14c(7), Another Mile-
stone on the Historical Road Toward Protecting the Creditor Against Dishonest Petitions,
33 Temp. L.Q. 210, 215 (1960).
"0 In the Matter of Korman, 172 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
"' In re Beckman, 6 F. Supp. 957 (W.D. N.Y. 1934).
"'.In re Weismann, 1 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
'" In re Roberts, 169 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1948).
14 In re Simon, 216 F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955).
"' In re McNay, 58 F. Supp. 960 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
156In re Gerson, 35 F.2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
" In re Sperling, 72 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1934).
156 Koufman v. Sheinwald, 83 F.2d 977 (1st Cir. 1936).
".. In re Zimmerman, 6 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. N.Y. 1934).
560In re Gerson, 35 F.2d 539 (E.D. Pa. 1929).
' See section on history, supra pp. 309-12.
'
6
'Maclachlan, Bankruptcy 88 (1956); Nadler, Bankruptcy 664 (1948).
''Conditioning or Suspending Discharges, 18 Ref. J. 40, 76 (1944), 19 Ref. J. 45
(1945); Oldham, Conditioning or Suspending Bankruptcy Discharges, 7 Texas B.J. 107
(1944); Radin, Discharge in Bankruptcy, 8 Ref. J. 160 (1934); Willis, Discharge in
Bankruptcy-A Suggested Change, 3 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 489 (1917).
164 Att'y Gen. Rep., Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System, S. Doc. No. 65,
72d Cong., 3d Sess. 10-25 (1932); Donovan Rep., Administration of Bankrupt Estates,
71st Cong., 3d Sess. 20-22 (Comm. Print 1931).
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when he surrenders into court all of his non-exempt property for
the benefit of his creditors... and has not breached one of the seven
grounds under section 14c, there is an academic question whether a
discharge is a privilege or a right. The question is academic in that
the referee is no longer required to investigate the merits of an ap-
plication for discharge, but according to the language of the statute
the referee must grant the discharge unless satisfied that one or more
of the seven statutory grounds for objection exist.' Further, the
referee's requisite satisfaction must not be based upon his whimsical
or capricious judgment, but rather the referee must apply the various
tests (each having a well-accepted meaning) as set out in the de-
cisions construing the various subsections under section 14c."' The
fact that the referee cannot be arbitrary supports the contention that
the bankrupt has a legal right to a discharge.8 unless guilty of one
of the acts which constitute grounds for denial. The theory that
discharge is a matter of right is well exemplified in the case of
Hardie v. Swatford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 5 which states "that the
release of the honest, unfortunate, and insolvent debtor from the
burden of his debts and his restoration to business activity, in the
interest of his family and the general public, are the main, if not
the most important, objects of the law." Yet, some courts continue
to speak in the language of the civil law nations, i.e., a discharge is
a great privilege and even a prize.' Moreover, other courts follow-
ing this view state that the primary purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
is the collection of the debtor's estate and its distribution to his
creditors,'' with the discharge as a mere incidental or secondary
purpose.' Judge Ray, who was a member of the House Judiciary
Committee when the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was enacted, epitomiz-
ed this type of thinking in the case of In re Leslie."' Judge Ray's
language was as follows:
The main purpose of the bankruptcy law is to prevent preferences,
and secure a fair and equitable division of the bankrupt estate among
the creditors, not to grant a discharge from all his debts. The attain-
ment of the first is not to be sacrificed to the accomplishment of the
last.
165 Moore, Debtors' and Creditors' Rights 13 (1955).
566 Collier, op. cit. supra note 144, at 1251.
17In re Smatlak, 99 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1938).
166 In re Pinkston, 93 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Tex. 1950).
169 165 Fed. 588 (5th Cir. 1908).
17 In re Bryant, 188 Fed. 530 (M.D. Pa. 1911); see Dixwell v. Scott & Co., 115 F.2d
873 (1st Cir. 1940), where the court described the discharge in bankruptcy as a privilege.
'7' Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
'In re Levenstein, 180 Fed. 957 (D. Conn. 1910).
171 119 Fed. 406, 410 (N.D. N.Y, 1903).
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In light of the fact that, concerning discharges, Congress may
prescribe any regulations or restrictions which are not unreason-
able," 4 the academic question of whether a discharge is a right or
privilege becomes practical from the standpoint of considering the
question of whether Congress should change, revise, or retain the
present discharge section of the Bankruptcy Act. As previously
stated, this question has been the subject of much debate and, as in
most cases of legislation, Congress will try to meet the needs of the
people.
V. PURPOSE OF THE DISCHARGE
The statistics recorded in the introduction suggest that an exami-
nation of the purpose of the discharge section should be made. The
main reasons for the discharge are that it (1) is just and humane to
the debtor; (2) aids creditors in discovering and recovering assets;
and (3) gives effect to the sound public policy of not keeping a
debtor bound to his debts, but rather of restoring him to the business
community."5 At present the language of the statute states that the
referee "shall grant the discharge, unless . . ."'" the bankrupt be
guilty of one of the seven specified grounds set out in section 14c.
(Emphasis added.) The grounds for objection under section 14c are
to be strictly construed'. while the Bankruptcy Act is liberally con-
strued in favor of granting the discharge.7 8
A careful reading of the seven grounds for objection under section
14c will reveal how the three reasons are given effect. A lack of
fraudulent intent alone will not guarantee a discharge. Out of the
seven grounds, only three [(1), (3), and (4)] require a definite
finding of fraudulent intent. Ground (1) requires a fraudulent intent
to profit and to defraud creditors by commission of an offense punish-
able by imprisonment. Thus, an honest bankrupt would have no
problem. Ground (3) requires an intent to defraud when the bank-
rupt obtains credit, and this subsection is occasionally harsh for it
will prevent a discharge even if the debt was released prior to bank-
ruptcy. The 1960 amendment," ' however, limits subsection (3) to
businessmen, and thereby grants partial relief to noncommercial
bankrupts. "' Ground (4) requires an intent to delay, hinder, or de-
174 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
17' 7 Remington, Bankruptcy 43 (6th ed. 1955).
'O Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. 5 32(c) (Supp.
1960).
17 In re Groth, 36 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1929).
178 Roberts v. Ford & Son, 169 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1948).
171 § 14c(3), 74 Stat. 408, 11 U.S.C.A. S 32(c) (3) (Supp. 1960).
1'°The noncommercial bankrupt is still limited by § 17(2) which prohibits the dis-
charge of a debt obtained by a materially false statement in writing.
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fraud a creditor in conjunction with a transfer of property within
one year of the filing of the petition. At times, this provision pro-
duces harsh effects on the bankrupt because it is accompanied by a
presumption that a gratuitous transfer is fraudulent.
On the other hand, three other subsections under section 14c
[(2), (5), and (6) ] require the referee to use his discretion in decid-
ing the merits of the charge, according to various tests set out in
the cases. Ground (2), which formerly required fraudulent intent
when dealing with the failure to keep or preserve books or records,
now uses the test of whether the failure was "justified under all
circumstances of the case." This change in tests is a step in the
direction of restraining the bankrupt by not giving him a clear cut
test as to when he will be denied a discharge. On the other hand, as
stated earlier, the new test now allows the bankrupt an opportunity
to justify his conduct. Ground (6), likewise, requires no fraudulent
intent because the referee may deny discharge by merely finding that
the bankrupt refused to answer a material question. Again, harsh
results may occur because the privilege against self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment is not available in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Ground (7) has been termed a "catch-all" '' because it allows
refusal of a discharge when the referee thinks refusal is justified
simply because there is no satisfactory explanation for insolvency or
for unexplained shortages. On the other hand, there is argument that
subsection (7) is not a "catch-all" because the referee cannot follow
his own whim or caprice. '
The last ground for consideration, (5), is clear. No fraud is
necessary because subsection (5) is purely for the creditors' sake, so
that a bankrupt will not try to be released from debts too often by
bankruptcy discharges.
Due to the large percentage of bankruptcies in the United States,
there is a definite need for economic rehabilitation through discharge.
In this respect the discharge is one of the most beneficial features of
the Bankruptcy Act. Hence, a noted writer wrote:18'
Statistically speaking, the debtor relief aspect of bankruptcy looms
large. . . .The discharge implements a well established public policy
in favor of preventing debtors from being permanently engulfed by
a single failure .... [T]he discharge in bankruptcy is generally recog-
nized as having definite social value.
In this light laymen, legislators, lawyers, and jurists have come to
recognize bankruptcy as a haven for poor debtors extended for the
... Shaiman, supra note 149, at 218.
182 For an enlightening discussion on this point, see Herzog, supra note 146.
I"'Maclachlan, op. cit. supra note 162, at 16-17.
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purpose of terminating existing liabilities upon surrender of their
estates.1
4
The relative ease of obtaining discharges has also brought about
certain abuses worth weighing against the act's social value. A large
number of persons have gone into bankruptcy and obtained dis-
charges when they could have worked out a plan for future pay-
ments that would enable the creditor to receive a greater percentage
of his money. There is also the situation in which a corporation will
obtain a discharge in bankruptcy and dissolve; then the old share-
holders will form a new corporation, often under the same condi-
tions and in the same locality. Although questionable, this practice
is obviously a most effective way of handling corporate debts.
One may view the discharge provisions as socialistic and as creat-
ing a most formidable danger to our capitalistic economy."' The
argument is that bankruptcy at present is somewhat of an insurance
policy for the debtor and that the creditor pays the premiums. The
better view, however, appears to be that the Bankruptcy Act is not
socialistic, but is merely a necessary adjustment factor of our complex
credit system. Refusing to release debtors would place a much greater
burden on society than releasing them, for the obvious reason that
a large percentage of the debtors, unable to rehabilitate themselves
or their families and with no chance of returning and contributing
to the economy, would be forever a burden on the community. Thus,
the end result of refusing to release debtors would necessitate a
resort to some extreme form of socialism. Consequently, the dis-
charge in bankruptcy actually serves to ward off, rather than en-
courage socialism.
Discharge is one of the mainsprings of our capitalistic economy.
In the past, when a man failed financially, he moved West and started
a new life. The span of many miles and the poor transportation
acted as an effective release from creditors. As the frontier faded into
history, the discharge took its place. Thus, the discharge serves as
another link in one of America's greatest traditions, i.e., the right to
fail and to start over again. This right has been one of the main fac-
tors in giving our country its high economic standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts should continue to apply the principle that the dis-
charge is a matter of right. Further, construction of the statute should
1:4 1 Collier, op. cit. supra note 144, at 1254.
s See the recent article discussing the problems and presenting the statistics on non-
commercial bankruptcy. Snedecor, Consumer Credit and Bankruptcy, 35 Ref. J. 37 (1961).
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be pursuant to definite, ascertainable tests and there should be no
judicial discretion placed in the hands of the referee to allow or dis-
allow the discharge on purely equitable grounds. Furthermore, the
statute should only be modified for the purpose of rehabilitating the
honest debtor rather than being harsh on him.
It is apparent that the present Bankruptcy Act reaches a high
sophistication of legislation, commensurate with our highly complex
credit economy's great need for rehabilitation of the honest debtor,
by combining the "Hebrew Jubilee" idea of debtor relief with the
strong desire to safeguard the creditors' rights.
